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2 
Abstract 25 
In this paper we outline a framework for the study of the mechanisms involved in the 26 
engagement of human agents with cultural affordances. Our aim is to better understand how 27 
culture and context interact with human biology to shape human behavior, cognition, and 28 
experience. We attempt to integrate several related approaches in the study of the embodied, 29 
cognitive, and affective substrates of sociality and culture and the sociocultural scaffolding of 30 
experience. The integrative framework we propose bridges cognitive and social sciences to 31 
provide (i) an expanded concept of ‘affordance’ that extends to sociocultural forms of life, and 32 
(ii) a multilevel account of the socioculturally scaffolded forms of affordance learning and the 33 
transmission of affordances in patterned sociocultural practices and regimes of shared attention. 34 
This framework provides an account of how cultural content and normative practices are built on 35 
a foundation of contentless basic mental processes that acquire content through immersive 36 
participation of the agent in social practices that regulate joint attention and shared intentionality.  37 
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Introduction  38 
The acquisition of culture is notoriously difficult to study. Over 70 years of research on the 39 
development of person-perception, for example, have made it clear that children as young as 4 40 
years of age have already acquired implicit biases about ethnicity and other socially constructed 41 
categories of persons (Clark & Clark, 1939; Clark, 1963; Hirschfeld, 1996; Aboud & Amato, 42 
2008; Machery & Faucher, 2005; Kelly, Faucher, & Machery, 2010; Huneman & Machery, 43 
2015; Pauker et al, 2016). These biases are consistent with the dominant culture of their 44 
societies, but are most often not consciously held or explicitly taught by their caregivers and 45 
educators. While most young children express a positive bias toward people they identify as 46 
members of their own group, children from minority groups typically show preferences for 47 
dominant groups, rather than for persons of their own ethnicity (Clark & Clark, 1939; Kinzler & 48 
Spelke, 2011). How such biases are acquired is still an open question. Ethnographic studies of 49 
socialization, education, and language acquisition have pointed to broad cross-cultural variations 50 
in how children are instructed, spoken to, expected to behave, involved in community activities, 51 
and exposed to other socializing agents beyond nuclear or extended families (Mead, 1975; 52 
Rogoff, 2003; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1999). However, by age 5, children across cultures have for 53 
the most part become proficient in the dominant set of expectations and representations of their 54 
cultures, despite the much discussed poverty of cultural stimuli to which they are exposed 55 
(Chomsky, 1965). These matters point to a human propensity for ‘picking up’ the broad scripts 56 
of culture even without any explicit instruction. In other words, we all come to acquire the shared 57 
background knowledge, conceptual frameworks, and dominant values of our culture. The 58 
presence of intuitive or implicit, yet stable and widely shared beliefs and attitudes among 59 
children constitutes a challenging problem for cognitive and social science.   60 
In this paper, we outline a framework for the study of the mechanisms that mediate the 61 
acquisition of cultural knowledge, values, and practices in terms of perceptual and behavioural 62 
affordances. Our aim is to better understand how culture and context shape human behavior and 63 
experience by integrating several related approaches in the study of the embodied, cognitive, and 64 
affective substrates of action and the sociocultural scaffolding of embodied experience. The 65 
integrative framework we propose bridges cognitive and social sciences to provide (i) an 66 
expanded concept of ‘affordance’ that extends to sociocultural forms of life, and (ii) a multilevel 67 
account of the socioculturally scaffolded forms of affordance learning and the transmission of 68 
affordances in patterned sociocultural practices.  69 
The context of the present discussion is the search for the ‘natural origins of content’ (Hutto & 70 
Satne 2015). We hope to contribute to the naturalistic account of the emergence of semantic 71 
content, that is, of the evolution (in phylogeny) and acquisition (in ontogeny) of representational 72 
or propositional content. Cultural worlds seem to be full of meaningful ‘content’—of explicit 73 
ways to think about and respond to the world in terms of kinds of agents, actions, and salient 74 
events. ‘Content’, here, is defined in terms of representational relations with satisfaction 75 
conditions: a vehicle x bears some semantic or representational content y just in case there are 76 
satisfaction conditions which, when they obtain, tell us that the vehicle is about something. 77 
Semantics is an intensional notion (Piccinini, 2015; Millikan, 1984, 2004, 2005; Haugeland, 78 
1990). How do humans acquire this cultural knowledge and capacity to respond in social 79 
contexts in ways that actors and others find meaningful and appropriate? 80 
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We hypothesize that agents acquire semantic content through their immersion in, and dynamic 81 
engagement with, feedback or looping mechanisms that mediate shared intentionality and shared 82 
attention. Semantic content, we suggest, is realized in culturally shared expectations, which are 83 
embodied at various levels (in brain networks, cultural artifacts, and constructed environments) 84 
and are enacted in ‘regimes’ of shared attention. We generalize contemporary ecological, 85 
affordance-based models of cognitive systems adapting to their contexts over ontogeny and 86 
phylogeny to account for the acquisition of cultural meanings and for the elaborate scaffoldings 87 
constituted by constructed, ‘designer’ niches (Clark 2016; Kirchhoff, 2015a; Hutchins, 2014). 88 
We suggest that ‘regimes of shared attention’—that is, patterned cultural practices (Roepstorff, 89 
Niewohner & Beck, 2010) that direct the attention of participant agents—modulate the 90 
acquisition of culturally-specific sets of expectations. Recent work in computational 91 
neuroscience on predictive processing provides a model of how cultural affordances could 92 
scaffold the acquisition of socially shared representational content. In what follows, we shall 93 
sketch a multilevel framework that links neural computation, embodied experience, cultural 94 
affordances, and the social distribution of representations.  95 
We begin by specifying a conceptual framework for ‘cultural affordances’, building on recent 96 
accounts of the notion of affordances in ecological, enactivist, and radical embodied cognitive 97 
science (Box 1). We propose to distinguish two kinds of cultural affordances: ‘natural’ 98 
affordances and ‘conventional’ affordances. Natural affordances are possibilities for action, the 99 
engagement with which depends on an organism or agent exploiting or leveraging reliable 100 
correlations in its environment with its set of abilities. For instance, given a human agent’s 101 
bipedal phenotype and related ability to walk, an unpaved road affords a trek. Conventional 102 
affordances are possibilities for action, the engagement with which depends on agents’ skillfully 103 
leveraging explicit or implicit expectations, norms, conventions, and cooperative social practices. 104 
Engagement with these affordances requires that agents have the ability to correctly infer 105 
(implicitly or explicitly) the culturally specific sets of expectations in which they are 106 
immersed—expectations about how to interpret other agents, and the symbolically and 107 
linguistically mediated social world. Thus, a red light affords stopping not merely because red 108 
lights correlate with stopping behavior, but also because of shared (in this case, mostly explicit) 109 
norms, conventions, and rules. Both kinds of cultural affordances are relevant to understanding 110 
human social niches; and both natural and conventional affordances may be socially constructed, 111 
albeit in different ways (Hacking, 1999). Human biology is cultural biology; culture has roots in 112 
human biological capacities. The affordances with which human beings engage are cultural 113 
affordances.  114 
We then assess the tensions between our proposed framework and radical enactivist and 115 
embodied approaches, which are typically committed to forms of non- (or even anti-) 116 
representationalism. On these views, perception, cognition, and action need not involve 117 
computational or representational resources. The scope of this claim varies. For some, this entails 118 
a rejection of computational or representational models and metaphors in the study of the mind—119 
a staunch commitment to anti-representationalism (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991; Gallagher, 120 
2001, 2008; Thompson, 2007; Chemero, 2009). More conciliatory positions instead suggest that 121 
basic cognitive processes are without content, but accommodate a place for contentful cognition. 122 
They claim that certain typically human forms of cognition involve representations, in the sense 123 
that human agents have the dispositions (mechanisms, behavioral repertoires, etc.) that are 124 
required to immersively engage with sociocultural content (e.g., patterned symbolic practices, 125 
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linguistic constructions, storytelling and narration). We argue that contemporary computational 126 
neuroscience complements the more conciliatory of these approaches by providing a minimal 127 
neural-computational scaffolding for the skilled engagement of organisms with the available 128 
affordances.  129 
Having done this, we turn to affordances in social and linguistic forms of life. We examine local 130 
ontologies, understood as sets of shared expectations, as well as the complex feedback relations 131 
(or looping effects) between these ontologies and human modes of communication, shared 132 
intentionality, and shared attention. Drawing on the skilled intentionality framework (Bruineberg 133 
& Rietveld, 2014), we examine the dynamics of cultural affordance acquisition through patterned 134 
cultural practices, notably attentional practices. We hypothesize that feedback mechanisms 135 
between patterned regimes of attention and shared forms of intentionality (notably shared 136 
expectations and immersion in local ontologies) leads to the acquisition of such affordances. This 137 
framework can guide future research on multilevel, recursive, nested cultural affordances and the 138 
social norms and individual expectations on which they depend. 139 
1. A theoretical framework for affordances 140 
Much recent work in cognitive science has been influenced by the notion of affordances 141 
originally introduced by Gibson (1986). The interdisciplinary framework currently being 142 
developed to study affordances provides us with a point of departure for thinking about the 143 
evolution and acquisition of semantic, representational content. The aim of this section is to 144 
clarify the implications of adopting this framework.  145 
Affordances are central to the emerging ‘enactivist’ and ‘radical embodied’ paradigms in 146 
cognitive neuroscience. Theorists of enactive cognition model the intelligent adaptive behavior 147 
of living cognitive systems as the dynamic constitution of meaning and salience in rolling cycles 148 
of perception and action, explicitly recognizing the emergence of meaning and salience in the 149 
active, embodied engagement of organisms with their environment (Noë, 2005; Thompson, 150 
2007; Froese & Di Paolo, 2011; Di Paolo, 2009, 2005; Hutto & Myin, 2013; Di Paolo & 151 
Thompson, 2014; Hutto & Satne, 2015; Kirchhoff, 2016). Embodied approaches in cognitive 152 
science explain the feats of intelligence displayed by cognitive systems by considering the 153 
dependence of cognition on the various aspects of the body as it engages with its environment, 154 
both internal and external (Shapiro, 2010; Barsalou, 2008). ‘Radical embodied’ cognitive science 155 
extends the theoretical framework of ecological psychology (Gibson, 1986) to the embodied 156 
cognition paradigm, providing a phenomenologically plausible account of active, dynamical 157 
coping (Thompson & Varela, 2001; Chemero, 2003, 2009; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; 158 
Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014). Recently, the enactive, radical enactive, and radical embodied 159 
approaches have been extended to ‘higher-order’ social and cultural systems (Froese & Di Paolo, 160 
2011; Hutto & Myin, 2013; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014). This latter branch of enactivist theory 161 
will concern us especially.    162 
1.1. Perspectives, affordances, and phenomenology  163 
One of the distinctive contributions of ecological, radical embodied, and enactivist theories of 164 
cognition is their shared emphasis on the point of the view of the organism itself, understood as 165 
an intentional center of meaningful behavior. The implication of these ‘perspectivist’ approaches 166 
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in cognitive science is that the world is disclosed as a set of ‘affordances’, that is, possibilities for 167 
action afforded to organisms by the things and creatures that populate its environmental niche, as 168 
engaged through their perceptual and sensorimotor abilities (Silva et al., 2013; Heft, 2001; Reed, 169 
1996; Turvey, 1992; Turvey et al., 1981; cf. also Varela, 1999; Thompson, 2007). To paraphrase 170 
Wittgenstein, the world is the totality of possibilities of action, not of things. Perspectivist 171 
approaches in cognitive science operationalize this view of the organism and propose an account 172 
of perception, cognition, and action that is closer to the phenomenology of everyday experience.  173 
Affordances provide an alternative framework for thinking about perception, cognition, and 174 
action that dissolves the strict conceptual boundary between these categories in a way that is 175 
closer to the phenomenology of everyday life.1 This approach echoes the kernel insights of the 176 
phenomenology of Heidegger (1962) and Merleau-Ponty (2012, 1968) about perception and 177 
action. Cognitive agents experience the world perceptually through the mediation of action, as a 178 
function of those actions that things in the world afford. For example, my cup of coffee is not 179 
first perceived as having such and such properties (size, shape, color), and only then as providing 180 
the opportunity for sipping dark roast. Instead, my filled cup is directly perceived as affording 181 
the action of sipping. Filled cups of coffee afford sipping; a paved road affords walking; a red 182 
traffic light affords stopping. The claim, then, is that cognitive agents typically do not encounter 183 
the world that they inhabit as a ‘pre-given’, objective, action-neutral set of things and properties, 184 
to be reconstructed in perception and cognition on the basis of sensory information, as classical 185 
models in cognitive science once suggested (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Marr, 1982; Dawson, 2013). The 186 
things that we engage are disclosed instead directly as opportunities for action—that is, as 187 
affordances. As Heidegger (1962) famously argued, it is only when my smooth coping breaks 188 
down (say, when I run out of coffee, or when the cup breaks) that the objective properties of the 189 
cup become salient, present in perceptual experience at all.  190 
The principal motivation for thinking of perception, cognition, and action in terms of 191 
engagement with affordances is that cognitive scientific accounts of these activities ought to be 192 
coherent with the phenomenology of action and perception in everyday life. Phenomenology 193 
tells us that there are dense interrelations between action and perception, that perception is 194 
mainly about the control of action, and that action serves to guide perception (Merleau-Ponty, 195 
2012, 1968). Affordances provide a framework apt for this task, allowing us to integrate 196 
phenomenological experience into our models of explanation in cognitive science (Varela, 1996; 197 
                                                 
1 Enactive accounts reject the rigid separation of perception, cognition, and action, emphasizing 
that organisms cope with their environment in rolling cycles of engagement in which the 
distinction between action, cognition, and perception is blurred. When such a distinction is made, 
enactivist thinkers typically resist the traditional picture that subordinates action to perception or 
cognition. Theorists who draw the distinction nevertheless emphasize the deep connection 
between perception, cognition, and action. There are good reasons to think that action is a 
precondition for perception or that perception is a form of action (Clark 2016; Kirchhoff 2016). 
As we shall see in section 2., free-energy approaches frame perception and action as 
complementary ways of minimizing ‘prediction error’. Our preference is to speak of rolling 
cycles of ‘action-perception’ to refer to the complex looping process whereby organisms cope 
with their environment. These cycles rely on various complementary computational strategies to 
minimize prediction error, which may (or may not) correspond to the traditional concepts of 
action, cognition, and perception. 
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Petitot et al., 1999). As the story goes, in the wake of the behaviorist turn, experiential factors 198 
and mentalist language were banished from psychology (Watson, 1913; Skinner, 1974). 199 
Cognitive science rehabilitated mentalism, at least to some extent, in its postulation of cognitive 200 
states and processes (Fodor, 1975; Putnam, 1975). Most contemporary functionalist and 201 
mechanistic accounts of cognition, however, contend that it is possible to exhaustively explain a 202 
cognitive function by specifying its functional organization or the mechanism that implements 203 
that function (e.g., Bechtel, 2008; Craver, 2007). As we shall see presently, the perspectivist 204 
emphasis on the dynamics of the phenomenology of everyday life that characterizes enactive and 205 
ecological approaches allows us to account for cognitive functions with a conceptual framework 206 
that explicitly bridges the phenomenology of action and perception, system dynamics, and 207 
functionalist cognitive neuroscience.  208 
1.2. Landscapes and fields  209 
Affordances, as possibilities for action, are fundamentally interactional. Their existence depends 210 
both on the objective material features of the environment and on the abilities of different kinds 211 
of organisms. This dependence on interaction does not mean that affordances have no objective 212 
reality or generalizability (Chemero, 2003, 2009). Affordances exist independently of specific 213 
individual organisms. Their existence is relative to sets of abilities available to certain kinds of 214 
organisms in a given niche. ‘Abilities’, here, refers to organisms’ or agents’ capabilities to 215 
skillfully engage the environment, that is, to adaptively modulate its patterns of action-perception 216 
to couple adaptively to the environment. Without certain abilities, correlative opportunities for 217 
action are unavailable. Certain chimpanzees, for instance, are able to use rocks to cracks nuts. 218 
But for nuts and rocks to afford cracking, the chimp must already be cognitively and 219 
physiologically equipped for nut-cracking. In Chemero’s model of affordances, objectivity and 220 
subjectivity do not have separate ontological status; they co-exist and co-emerge relationally.  221 
Building on Chemero (2003, 2009), Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) define an affordance as a 222 
relation between a feature or aspect of organisms’ material environment and an ability available 223 
in their form of life. ‘Form of life’ is a notion adapted from the later Wittgenstein (1953). A form 224 
of life is a set of behavioral patterns, relatively robust on socio-cultural or biographical time 225 
scales, which is characteristic of a group or population. We might say that each species (or 226 
subspecies), adapted as it is to a particular niche and endowed with specific adapted abilities, 227 
constitutes a unique form of life. Different human communities, societies, and cultures, with 228 
sometimes strikingly different styles of engagement with the material and social world, 229 
constitute different forms of life. There are thus at least two ways to change the affordances 230 
available to an organism: (i) by changing the material aspects of its environment (which may 231 
vary from small everyday changes in its architecture or configuration to thoroughgoing niche 232 
construction) and (ii) by altering its form of life or allowing it to learn new abilities already 233 
available in that form of life (interacting in new ways with an existing niche by acquiring new 234 
abilities through various forms of learning). 235 
Following recent theorizing on affordances (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; Bruineberg & 236 
Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld, 2008a, 2008c), we consider the distinction between the ‘landscape’ of 237 
affordances and the ‘field’ of relevant affordances. The claim is that, typically, organisms do not 238 
engage with one single affordance at a given time. The world we inhabit is instead disclosed as a 239 
matrix of differentially salient affordances with their own structure or configuration. The 240 
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organism encounters the world that it inhabits as an ensemble of affordances, with which it 241 
dynamically copes and which it evaluates, often implicitly and automatically, for relevance. For 242 
an affordance to have ‘relevance’ here means that the affordance in question ‘solicits’ the 243 
individual, concrete organism by beckoning certain forms of perceptual-emotional appraisal and 244 
readiness to act. This occurs because affordances are both descriptive and prescriptive: 245 
descriptive because they constitute the privileged mode for the perceptual disclosure of aspects 246 
of the environment; and prescriptive because they specify the kinds of action and perception that 247 
are available, situationally appropriate and, in the case of social niches, expected by others. 248 
The ‘landscape’ of affordances is the total ensemble of available affordances for a population in 249 
a given environment. This landscape corresponds to what evolutionary theorists in biology and 250 
anthropology call a ‘niche’ (Odling-Smee, Laland & Feldman, 2003; Wilson & Clark, 2009; 251 
Sterelny, 2007, 2014; Fuentes, 2014). A niche is a position in an ecosystem that affords an 252 
organism the resources it needs to survive. At the same time, the niche plays a role vis-à-vis 253 
other organisms and their niches in constituting the ecosystem as a whole. A typical ecosystem 254 
(that is, a physical environment where organisms can live) has multiple niches, which have some 255 
degree internal structure: affordances have a variety of dynamics relationships (one thing leads to 256 
another, depends on, reveals, hides, enables, other possibilities for action; Pezzulo & Cisek, 257 
2016). Thus, the niche is the entire set of affordances that are available, in a given environment 258 
at a given time, to organisms that take part in a given form of life. More narrowly, a niche 259 
comprises the affordances available to the group of organisms that occupy a particular place in 260 
the ecosystem—or, in the case of humans, the social world—associated with (and partly 261 
constituted by) a form of life.  262 
The ‘field’ of affordances, on the other hand, relates to the dynamic coping and intelligent 263 
adaptivity of autonomous, individual organisms. The field refers to those affordances that 264 
actually engage the individual organism at a given time. Of those affordances available in the 265 
landscape, some take on special relevance as a function of the interests, concerns, and states of 266 
the organism. These relevant affordances constitute the field of affordances for each organism. 267 
They are experienced as ‘solicitations’, in that they solicit (further) affective appraisal and 268 
thereby prompt patterns of ‘action readiness’, that is, act as perceptual and affective prompts for 269 
the organism to act on the affordance (Frijda, 1986, 2007; Rietveld, de Haan & Denys, 2013; De 270 
Haan et al, 2013). This engagement will vary in complexity, conformity, and creativity from pre-271 
specified or pre-patterned ways of acting to “free” improvisation, as we shall see below.2  272 
                                                 
2 Some might express unease at the mixed language we use, which straddles phenomenology, 
system dynamics, and cognitive functions. We take this as a virtue of the multilevel nature of the 
explanatory framework provided by the notion of affordances, which is operative at all of these 
different descriptive levels. Readers who would prefer to keep phenomenological description 
distinct from other explanatory levels (i.e., neural, social, cultural levels of explanation) can 
replace our talk of directly modulating the landscape or field of affordances with a more 
phenomenologically neutral concept, such as the organism’s ‘selective openness’ (Bruineberg & 
Rietveld, 2014). With this terminology, we might say that changes in the patterns of activity in 
the organism (states, interests, etc.) and the environment shape the organism’s selective openness 
to saliencies.  
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The field of affordances changes through cycles of perception and action. Changes in the 273 
situation that the organism engages give rise dynamically to different solicitations, as a function 274 
of the state of the organism, much the way a physical gauge field gives rise to different potentials 275 
as a function of the local forces (Sengupta et al., 2016). Consider the action of drinking a cup of 276 
coffee. The filled cup affords a gradient (grasping, sipping), that is, a potential for coupled 277 
engagement. When generated by the organism-environment system, this gradient can be 278 
experienced by the organism as a solicitation. The gradient is dissipated through engagement. 279 
The experience of satiation that follows drinking, combined with the fact that cup has been 280 
emptied, alter the field of affordances, which as indicated changes as a function of the states of 281 
organism and niche. Thus, the gradient is ‘consumed’ or dissipates after successful engagement.    282 
1.3. Meaning and affordances 283 
Not all affordances are of the same kind. Here we draw on Grice’s theory of meaning to suggest 284 
an approach to the varieties of cultural affordances in terms of their dependence on content-285 
involving conventions. We argue that the affordances in human niches (what we call generally 286 
‘cultural’ affordances) are of two distinct kinds: ‘natural’ and ‘conventional’ affordances.  287 
Grice’s theory of meaning, elaborated in a series of papers in the philosophy of mind (1957, 288 
1969, 1971, 1989), and later refined by Sperber and Wilson (1986), Levinson (2000), and 289 
Tomasello (2014), is often termed ‘intention-based semantics’, or ‘implicature’. On a Grician 290 
account, meaning lies in a speaker’s communicative intent; that is, in what she intends to convey 291 
through an utterance. Grice elaborated the first formula of his theory of meaning in these terms 292 
(using the subscript NN to signify to ‘non-natural’): 293 
“A meantNN something by X” is roughly equivalent to “A uttered X with the 294 
intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention” (Grice, 295 
1989, 19) 296 
Taking this model beyond the dyadic sphere of conversational implicature, Grice later attempted 297 
to explain how “timeless” (that is to say, durable and widely shared) conventions of meaning are 298 
recognized in a shared cultural repertoire: 299 
“x meansNN (timeless) that so-and-so” might at a first shot be equated with some 300 
statement or disjunction of statements about what “people” (vague) intend (with 301 
qualifications about “recognition”) to effect by x (Grice, 1989, 220) 302 
In the subsequent ‘relevance’ account, Sperber & Wilson (1986) translated this automatic ‘first 303 
shot’ recognition of conventional meaning as one in which human minds scan for salient, 304 
meaning-generating cues in the environment, and stop processing when the cues are secured.  305 
Our model draws on Grice to describe the stabilization of cultural cues as affordances. Key to 306 
our approach is the implied ontological and epistemic status of other minds (that is, the intentions 307 
of ‘persons’) in the embodied cognitive work required in the ‘recognition’, or more precisely, the 308 
enactment of meaning. Our proposal, then, is to follow Grice in understanding the thought, 309 
affect, and behavior of human agents as determined by implicit expectations about others’ 310 
expectations. Specifically, we argue that humans behave according to the way they expect others 311 
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to expect them to behave in a given situation (see Figure 1).3 As we shall explicate below, we 312 
contend that humans operate (often pre-reflectively) within the landscape and field of 313 
possibilities for variations in action4 as a function of their expectations about what others expect 314 
of them in specific contexts (see Figure 2). 315 
[Figure 1 about here] 316 
[Figure 2 about here] 317 
The importance of these revisions to Grice’s model of meaning to our framework for cultural 318 
affordances is to highlight the dependence of certain kinds of affordances on joint intentionality, 319 
and effective social and cultural normativity and conventionality, or equivalently, the shared 320 
expectations (both implicit and explicit) that codetermine the affordance landscape and local 321 
field dynamics. Grice (1957) distinguished between natural and non-natural forms of meaning, 322 
emphasizing the latter in most of his work. Natural meaning is a relation between two things that 323 
are correlated. Smoke ‘means’ fire because tokens of smoke reliably correlate with tokens of fire. 324 
Similarly, (certain kinds of) spots mean measles (understood not as the popular category but as 325 
the biomedically recognized infection with a particular virus). Non-natural meaning instead 326 
depends on the capacity of individual agents to exploit explicit and implicit social ‘conventions’ 327 
(in the wide sense of locally shared norms, values and moral frames, expectations, ontologies, 328 
etc.) to infer the intentional states of other agents and thereby engage them or engage aspects of 329 
the environment with them. Red traffic lights, in virtue of convention (and law), ‘mean’ stop, and 330 
hence afford (and mandate) stopping—and this is made possible by the specifically human 331 
mastery of recursive inferences, both explicit and implicit, that agents make about other agents 332 
(Tomasello, 2014).  333 
Recent work on information processing has extended Grice’s framework to account for different 334 
kinds of information (Piccinini, 2015; Piccinini & Scarantino, 2011; Scarantino & Piccinini, 335 
2010). ‘Natural information’ obtains when a token informational vehicle x of kind X (that is, a 336 
sign, a pattern of neural activation, or what have you) carries natural information about some 337 
information source y of kind Y just in case there are reliable correlations between X and Y. 338 
Natural information, in other words, cannot misrepresent, for it is non-semantic; it is not the kind 339 
of thing that can be simply true or false. Such information can be exploited and leveraged by a 340 
                                                 
3 This basic cognitive formula for sociality requires three orders of automatic intentionality; that 
it is to say, an implicit, non-narrative, hypothesis-generating, error-reduction scenario of the “I 
think they think I think” variety that can be translated as “what would relevant others expect me 
to think/feel/do in this situation?” 
4 The notion of variation and improvisation in action within a convention is very important. 
Humans do not simply obey prescribed expectations, but also resist, transgress and transform 
them. Specific fields of joint-intentional affordances, thus, invariably entail different licenses for 
improvisation on expected behavior. The background formula for action is not simply “what 
would others expect me to do here?” but also “how much license or room to improvise do I have 
here given what the set of local cues tells me about others’ expectations and the norms that 
should otherwise govern my behavior in this specific situation?” 
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cognitive system to guide intelligent behavior. Conversely, ‘non-natural information’ (or as we 341 
prefer to put it, ‘conventional information’), pertains to semantic, content-involving 342 
representations that depend on social norms and cultural background knowledge. Non-natural 343 
information allows an agent to make a correct inference about some aspect of an intentional 344 
system, e.g., other agents, language and other symbolic systems such as mathematics, etc. Non-345 
natural information is semantic in that it obtains in virtue of satisfaction conditions (e.g., truth 346 
conditions). A vehicle carries this kind of information about some state of affairs just in case 347 
some (explicit or implicit) shared convention, in the sense outlined above, links a vehicle to what 348 
it represents.  349 
In the psychological and anthropological literature, affordances are usually understood as 350 
interactional properties between organisms and their environment that can be individually 351 
discovered in ontogeny without social learning. Chimpanzees, for example, rediscover how to 352 
crack nuts with rocks in each generation without vertical social transmission of skills (Ingold, 353 
2001, 2000; Howes, 2011; Moore, 2013). Most of what humans do, in contrast, is learned 354 
socially and requires complex forms of coordination. We suggest, however, that successfully 355 
learned human conventions that govern action are also best conceptualized as affordances.  Such 356 
affordances depend on shared sets of expectations, reflected in the ability to engage immersively 357 
in patterned cultural practices, which reference, depend on, or enact folk ontologies, moralities 358 
and epistemologies. We might call these ‘conventional’ affordances.  359 
An empty street affords being walked on or driven on to the lone pedestrian or driver. Yet 360 
affordances, especially those depending on conventions, might differ depending on context. A 361 
red traffic light, as we have seen, affords an agent stopping, particularly in the presence of others, 362 
and especially in the presence (real or imagined) of police who are expect to intervene. But a 363 
driver might alter her behavior as a result of not being seen by others. A red traffic light in an 364 
empty street at 4:00 AM, thus, might afford transgression of the stopping rule following an 365 
inference about the absence of other minds likely to judge the agent. Departing from Grice and 366 
earlier theories of information processing (Dretske, 1995), one might understand the notion of 367 
information as probabilistic: to carry information implies only the truth of a probabilistic claim 368 
(Scarantino, 2015; Scarantino & Piccinini, 2010). Although this account was developed for 369 
natural information, we extend it here to conventional information, given the prominence of 370 
social improvisation. ‘Conventions’ need not be explicitly formulated as rules, and may instead 371 
originate in the actors’ engagement with local backgrounds over time, that is, from non-372 
contentful developmental experiences, learning, or participation in social and cultural practices 373 
(Piccinini, 2015; Satne, 2015).  374 
A cultural artifact may have multiple affordances according to its embedding in larger webs of 375 
relationships that are part of the individual’s history of learning and the expectations for the 376 
potential participation of others. Indeed, to operate with conventional affordances, agents must 377 
have shared sets of expectations—we must know what others expect us to expect 378 
Simple rule-governed models of sociality go on the assumption that conventions lead to stable, 379 
binary affordances, where satisfaction conditions are either met or not. However, cultural 380 
symbols and signs are usually polysemous and their interpretation depends on context. 381 
Moreover, variations in the way agents engage with affordances in practice, often license what 382 
we could term ‘skilled improvisation’. Rules and conventions can be followed slavishly, 383 
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selectively ignored, deliberately transgressed, or re-interpreted to afford new possibilities. 384 
Natural dispositions for shared intentionality in what Searle (1991, 1992, 1995, 2010) calls the 385 
deep background, on this view, give rise to cooperative action not only through convention but 386 
also through iterative variations governed by modes of engagement with cultural affordances 387 
(Terrone & Tagliafico, 2014).  388 
2. The neurodynamics of affordances  389 
Some aspects of culture clearly involve content in the improvisational sense of the term: namely, 390 
those affordances that depend on conventions, social normativity, and the ability to improvise 391 
from a joint-intentional background enriched by cultural learning. Here, we aim to contribute to 392 
the effort to explicate the mechanisms by which basic minds are scaffolded into more elaborate 393 
content-involving processes. To explain agents’ engagement with contentful affordances requires 394 
a theory of cultural content and representations.  395 
Our hypothesis, to be explicated below, is that feedback loops mediating shared attention and 396 
shared intentionality are the principal mechanism whereby cultural (especially conventional) 397 
affordances are acquired. Before proceeding, however, we must face an objection stemming 398 
from tensions between our enactivist-embodied-ecological framework and our aim of providing 399 
a theory for the acquisition of semantic content. We have suggested that conventional 400 
affordances depend on shared expectations, perspective-taking, and even mindreading abilities. 401 
However, proponents of radical embodiment and enactivism argue that cognition can be 402 
understood as the coupling of an organism to its niche through dynamical processes, without any 403 
need to invoke representational processes and resources like explicit expectations and 404 
mindreading (Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991; Gallagher, 2001, 2008; Thompson, 2007; 405 
Chemero, 2009). On these accounts, classical theories of cognition (Fodor, 1975; Marr, 1982), 406 
which modeled cognition as the rule-governed manipulation of internal representations, radically 407 
misconstrue the nature of agents’ intentional engagement with their worlds. The claim, then, is 408 
that much cognition can (indeed, must) be explained by appealing only to dynamical coupling 409 
between organism and environment. 410 
Rejecting the claim that cognition necessarily involves representations, radical enactivists insist 411 
that basic cognitive processes (‘basic minds’) can function entirely without content (Hutto & 412 
Myin, 2013; Thompson, 2007). The argument, then, is that minds, especially basic minds like 413 
those of simple organisms (and many of the unreflective embodied engagements of more 414 
complex minds), do not require content. They only require adequate forms of coupling, which 415 
need bear no content at all. Adequate coupling only requires an organism to leverage correlations 416 
that are reliable enough to be exploited for survival. This poses a challenge to a theory like ours, 417 
which aims to explicate the acquisition of cultural content in the form of conventional 418 
affordances. In this section, we accommodate this radical minimalism about representations and 419 
semantic content while sketching a neural computational account of the scaffolding of cultural 420 
affordances.  421 
2.1. Computation, representation, and minimal neural models  422 
Recent work on computation and neurodynamics helps to clarify the scope of radical arguments 423 
against content-involving, representational theories of cognition. Although older semantic 424 
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theories view computation as the processing of representations (with propositional content and 425 
satisfaction conditions) more recent theories do not make this assumption. The ‘modeling view’ 426 
of computation (Grush, 2001; Shagrir, 2006, 2010; Chirimuuta, 2014) suggests that computation 427 
in physical systems (calculators, digital and analog computers, neural networks) employs a 428 
special kind of minimal, structural or analogical model based on statistical correlations (O’Brien 429 
& Opie, 2004, 2009, 2015). On this view, a computational process is one that dynamically 430 
generates and uses a statistical model of a target domain (say, things in the visual field). The 431 
model is said to ‘represent’ that domain only in the sense that the relations between its 432 
computational vehicles (digits, neural activation patterns, or what have you) preserve the higher-433 
order statistical, structural-relational properties of the target domain, which can be leveraged to 434 
guide adaptive action. We might call this ‘weak’ (non-propositional) content, based on structural 435 
analogy between vehicle and target domain (O’Brien & Opie, 2004, 2009, 2015). Such statistical 436 
models are much more minimalistic than traditional representational theories of mind, which 437 
require that internal representations bear propositional content (Fodor, 1975). Even more 438 
minimalistic accounts of computation are available. Computation can be defined mechanistically, 439 
as the rule-governed manipulation of computational (rather than representational) vehicles 440 
(Piccinini, 2015; Milkowski, 2013). On the mechanistic account, computations (digital, analog, 441 
neural) can occur without any form of semantic content (Piccinini & Scarantino, 2011; 442 
Scarantino & Piccinini, 2010).  443 
Thus, some of the newest theories of computation are minimalistic about the representational 444 
nature of neural processes. Whether the modeling-structural and the mechanistic minimal 445 
statistical models deserve the label ‘representation’ is debatable (Anderson & Chemero, 2013; 446 
Hutto, 2015; Clark, 2016). To some degree the conflict may be merely terminological. What 447 
matters for our purposes is to note that the minimalistic statistical-computational models in the 448 
cognitive system can be leveraged to guide skilled intelligent, context-sensitive, adaptive 449 
behavior. This provides additional weight to the claim that basic minds are without strong, 450 
propositional, semantic content (Hutto & Myin, 2013; Hutto, Kirchhoff & Myin, 2014).  451 
While this may be the case, human societies clearly transact in content-laden representations. We 452 
use language replete with images, metaphors and other symbols to tell stories and narrate our 453 
lives. We imagine particular scenarios or events, and we think about, describe, elaborate and 454 
manipulate these images or models in ways that treat them as pictures or representations of 455 
possible realities. Importantly, even on the radical view on offer here, nothing precludes such 456 
content-involving cognition. In recent discussions around the natural origins of content, it is 457 
hypothesized that neural computations can come to acquire representational content when 458 
coupled adequately to a niche or milieu through dense histories of causal coupling (Hutto & 459 
Myin, 2013; Hutto & Satne, 2015; Kirmayer & Ramstead, 2016). We suggest that immersive 460 
involvement of agents in patterned cultural practices during development, and the subsequent 461 
practice of the abilities acquired in enculturation, allows for the acquisition of stable cultural 462 
affordances. In the case of human beings, whose learning is mostly social, the function of the 463 
neural computations performed by a system becomes that of interfacing adequately with both 464 
representational and non-representational aspects of culture so as to guide appropriate behavior.  465 
2.2. Free-energy and the neurodynamics of affordances 466 
The framework we think can account for the acquisition of cultural affordances by agents rests 467 
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on recent work in computational neuroscience and theoretical biology on the ‘free-energy 468 
principle’. The free-energy principle is a mathematical formulation of the tendency of 469 
autonomous living systems to adaptively resist entropic disintegration (Sengupta et al., 2016; 470 
Friston, 2013a, 2013b, 2012b, 2010; Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006). This disintegration can 471 
be thought of as the natural tendency of all organized systems (which are by their nature far-472 
from-equilibrium systems) to dissipate, that is, to return to a state of low organization and high 473 
entropy or disorder—in other words, to return to (thermodynamic) equilibrium. The free-energy 474 
principle states that the dynamics of living organisms are organized to maintain their existence 475 
by minimizing the information-theoretic quantity ‘variational free-energy’. By minimizing free-476 
energy, the organism resists entropic dissipation and maintains itself in its phenotypical steady-477 
state, far from thermodynamic equilibrium (death).  478 
One application of the free-energy principle in computational neuroscience is a family of models 479 
collectively referred to as ‘hierarchical predictive processing’ models, which instantiate a more 480 
general view of the brain as a ‘prediction machine’ (Frith, 2007; Bar, 2011; Friston, 2012a, 2011, 481 
2010; Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016; for empirical evidence, see Adams et 482 
al., 2016). In this framework, the brain is modeled as a complex dynamical system, the main 483 
function of which is to ‘infer’ (in a qualified sense) the distal causes of its sensory stimulation, 484 
starting only from its own sensory channels. The strategy employed by the brain, according to 485 
this view, is to use a ‘generative model’ of the distal causes and engage in self-prediction 486 
(Eliasmith, 2005; Friston, 2010). That is, the system’s function is to predict the upcoming 487 
sensory state and compare it the actual sensory state, while minimizing the difference between 488 
these two distributions (predictions and prediction errors) through ongoing modification of 489 
predictions or action on the environment (see Figure 3 and Figure 4).  490 
‘Generative models’ are minimal statistical models, of the kind discussed above. The use by a 491 
system of generative models need not entail semantic content. Their function is to dynamically 492 
extract and encode information about the distal environment as sets of probability distributions. 493 
The information involved here can be natural or conventional in kind. The only entailment is that 494 
the system or organism must leverage its generative model to guide skilled intentional coupling. 495 
The system uses this generative model to guide adaptive and intelligent behavior by ‘inverting’ 496 
that model through Bayesian forms of (computational, subpersonal) inference, allowing it to 497 
leverage the probability distributions encoded in the model to determine the most probable distal 498 
causes of that distribution and to act in the most contextually appropriate way (Clark, 2016; 499 
Hohwy, 2013; Friston, 2010).  500 
How does this inversion take place? Generative models are used to generate a prediction about 501 
the upcoming sensory distribution. Between the predicted and actual sensory distributions, there 502 
almost always will be a discrepancy (‘prediction error’), which ‘tracks’ surprisal (in the sense 503 
that, mathematically, it is an upper bound on that quantity). The free-energy principle states that 504 
all living systems act to reduce prediction error (and thereby implicitly resist the entropic 505 
tendency towards thermodynamic equilibrium—dissipation and death). This can occur in one of 506 
two complementary ways: (i) through action, where the best action most efficiently minimizes 507 
free-energy by making the world more like the prediction (‘active inference’); and (ii) through 508 
perception and learning, by selecting the ‘hypothesis’ (or prediction, which corresponds to the 509 
probable distal cause of sensory distribution) that most minimizes error, or changing the 510 
hypotheses when none fits or when one fits better (Friston, 2013a, 2011; Friston et al., 2012; 511 
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Friston & Frith, 2015a, 2015b). Given that generative models embody fine-grained statistical 512 
information about the distal environment at different scales, the top-down prediction signals 513 
(produced by higher levels in the processing system) provide crucial contextualizing information 514 
for the activity of lower levels in the predictive hierarchy, rendering the feedforward error signal 515 
contextually sensitive and adaptive (see Figure 5).  516 
[Figure 3 about here] 517 
[Figure 4 about here] 518 
[Figure 5 about here] 519 
The representational minimalism of embodied generative models nicely complements the 520 
representation-sparse phenomenology of affordances. Such minimal models might be described 521 
as exploiting (non-semantic) information for affordances, rather than (semantic) information 522 
about affordances (Van Dijk, Withagen & Bongers, 2014); that is, the sensory array only carries 523 
information given certain uses of it by organisms (i.e., being a statistical proxy). The ‘internal 524 
representations’ involved here might best be thought of as transiently ‘soft-assembled neural 525 
ensembles’, adequately coupled to environmental affordances (Anderson, 2014). 526 
It can be argued that predictive processing models complement enactivist and radical embodied 527 
approaches and are compatible with minimalism about representations, provided we do not 528 
interpret the statistical computations and error signal processes in a strong semantic, content-529 
involving sense (Kirmayer & Ramstead, 2016; Hutto & Satne, 2015; Kirchhoff, 2015a, 2015b, 530 
2016). Generative models are simply embodied statistical models that are dynamically leveraged 531 
to guide intelligent adaptive behavior.  532 
Generative models are embodied at different systemic levels and timescales, in different ways. 533 
As indicated, at the level of the brain, the predictive hierarchical architecture of neural networks 534 
come to encode statistical regularities about the niche, which allow the organism to engage with 535 
the field of affordances in adaptive cycles of action-perception. But the embodiment of 536 
generative models does not stop at the brain. Indeed, one radical implication of the free-energy 537 
principle is that the organism itself is a statistical model of its niche (Friston, 2011; Friston, 538 
2013b). States of the organism (i.e., its phenotype, behavioral patterns, and so forth) come to 539 
statistically model the niche that it inhabits over evolutionary timescales (Badcock, 2012). Thus, 540 
phylogeny conforms to the free-energy principle as well, because the effects of natural selection 541 
is to select against organisms that are poor models of their environments. Those organisms that 542 
survive and thrive are those that embody, in this literal sense, the best generative models of their 543 
niche. Organism phenotypes can be described as conforming to the free-energy principle over 544 
developmental timescales in morphogenesis as well (Friston et al., 2015c). Generative models 545 
are thus not only ‘embrained’, but embodied in an even stronger sense, over the timescales of 546 
phylogeny and ontogeny. This strong embodiment allows one to interpret free-energy approaches 547 
in a non-internalist way and to counter some objections raised against earlier formulations of 548 
predicting processing approaches (e.g., Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013). This multilevel embodiment 549 
of the generative model, as we shall argue below, extends to the concrete, material, human-550 
designed milieus (or ‘designer environments’) in which humans operate.  551 
  
16 
Some generative models (in this wide sense) involve semantic content and others do not (they 552 
involve something more minimal than satisfaction conditions, i.e., reliable covariation). The 553 
study of minds without content is compatible with more extensively content involving forms of 554 
(social and cultural) cognition that are scaffolded on such basic minds through processes of 555 
social learning and enculturation. 556 
On the radical enactivist account, content-involving forms of intentionality emerge in the context 557 
of certain cultural practices in human forms of life (Hutto & Satne, 2015). Many of these 558 
practices involve multi-agent situations in which proper engagement requires forms of implicit 559 
perspective-taking and perspective-sharing (Sterelny, 2015). In some cases, such practices can 560 
involve explicit ‘mindreading’ as well, that is, inferring the beliefs, intentions, and desires of 561 
other agents as such (Michael, Christensen, & Overgaard, 2014). There is a long-running debate 562 
among anthropologists over the extent to which inferences about other people’s mental states (as 563 
opposed to, say, bodily states) may reflect a folk psychology that is more pronounced among 564 
modern Western peoples (Rumsey, 2013; Robbins & Rumsey, 2008). This ‘transparency of 565 
mind’ folk psychology is contrasted in the literature with so-called ‘opacity doctrines’ found in 566 
other cultures, in which people’s interior states are said to be ‘opaque’, or unknowable. As recent 567 
multi-systems account of social cognition have shown, however, situations involving novel cues 568 
or too many orders of intentionality will often trigger ‘higher’ cognitive resources and compel 569 
humans to think about other people’s intentions as such   (Michael, Christensen & Overgaard, 570 
2014). Engagement with affordances in the human niche also often requires ‘mindshaping’, as 571 
our interpretation of other agents’ intentional profiles in turn shapes those same profiles through 572 
interpersonal loops (Zawidzki, 2013; Sterelny, 2007, 2015). Perspective-taking can be implicit 573 
and embodied in that organisms can act on situations by leveraging minimal models that encode 574 
information about other agents and their behavior without entailing the presence of semantic 575 
content (i.e., having satisfaction conditions). But this is not incompatible with the claim that 576 
perspective-taking and mindshaping abilities, in the human niche, often involve symbolically and 577 
linguistically mediated forms of communication, which substantially change the kind of 578 
affordance landscape available to human agents (Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2015, 2013).  579 
Although the perspectivist focus on the dynamic embodied enactment of meaning in a shared 580 
social world is central to our understanding of cultural affordances (Fuchs & De Jaegher, 2009; 581 
Gallagher, 2001, 2008), our contention is that the acquisition of representational content in 582 
‘epidemics’ of socially shared representations (Sperber, 1996; Claidière, Scott-Phillips & 583 
Sperber, 2014) entails that cognitive agents must be endowed with a neural-computational 584 
scaffolding adequate to such activities.5 Even though basic cognition (and indeed, some forms of 585 
‘higher’ cognition; Hutto & Myin, 2013) may be without content, given the symbolic and 586 
linguistic nature of human experience and culture, the human cognitive system must be equipped 587 
with the neural-computational resources needed to adequately couple with shared social 588 
representations, if we are to account for how the latter are transmitted stably and reliably. 589 
                                                 
5 We should note a few limitations of the ‘epidemic’ metaphor: (i) representations are not merely 
transmitted through contagion, but through many different means, modes of communication, and 
practices that are themselves culturally mediated; (ii) they reside not just in individuals, but also 
in artifacts and institutions; and (iii) they are usually not simply replicated, but modified or 
transformed by each individual or institution that takes them up.  
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Semantic content is acquired through dense histories of embodied engagement with the 590 
environment. For humans, this involves participation in patterned, linguistically and 591 
symbolically mediated practices—which include patterns of shared attention and shared 592 
intentionality.  593 
2.3. Predictive processing and attention  594 
One aspect of the architecture of predictive processing is crucial for our account of cultural 595 
affordances: The predictive processing model specifies a deep functional role for attention. 596 
Attention, on the predictive processing account, is modeled as ‘precision-weighting’, that is, the 597 
selective sampling of high precision sensory data, i.e., prediction error with a high signal-to-598 
noise ratio (Feldman & Friston, 2010). The efforts of the cognitive system to minimize free-599 
energy operate not only on first-order, correlational statistical information about the distal 600 
environment, but on second-order statistical information about the signal-to-noise ratio or 601 
‘precision’ (that is, inverse variance) of the prediction error signal as well. This allows the 602 
system to give greater weight to less noisy signals that may provide more reliable information. 603 
Based on this information, the cognitive system balances the gain (or ‘volume’) on the units 604 
carrying prediction errors at specific levels of the hierarchy, as a function of precision. This 605 
control function, in effect, controls the influence of encoded prior beliefs on action-perception 606 
(Friston, 2010). Greater precision means less uncertainty; the system thus ‘ups the volume’ on 607 
high precision error signals to leverage that information to guide behavior. Attention, then, is the 608 
process whereby synaptic gain is optimized to ‘represent’ (in the sense of reliably co-varying 609 
with) the precision of prediction error in hierarchical inference (Feldman & Friston, 2010; Clark, 610 
2016).  611 
Precision-weighting is centrally important in these architectures and has been proposed as a 612 
mechanism of neural gating. Gating is the process whereby effective connectivity in the brain 613 
(Friston, 1995, 2011), that is, the causal influence of some neural units on others, is controlled by 614 
the functioning of distinct control units (Stephan et al., 2008; den Ouden, et al. 2010; Daw, Niv, 615 
& Dayan, 2005). These are called ‘neural control structures’ by Clark (1998). (For assessments 616 
of the empirical evidence, see: Friston et al., 2015; Kok et al., 2012, 2013.) Attention-modulated 617 
‘gating’ is the central mechanism that allows for the formation of transient task- and context-618 
dependent coalitions or ensembles of neural units and networks (Anderson, 2014; Park & 619 
Friston, 2013; Sporns, 2010).  620 
Thus, in the predictive processing framework, attention is the main driver of action-perception. 621 
Clark (2016, 148ff) describes possible implementations of this scheme in the brain. Much like 622 
for first-order expectations, the system encodes expectations about precision in the generative 623 
model, presumably in the higher levels of the cortical hierarchy (Friston et al., 2014). These 624 
signals, which carry context-sensitive second-order statistical information, then guide the 625 
balancing act between top-down prediction signals from the generative models and bottom-up 626 
error signals in attention (see Figure 6).  627 
[Figure 6 about here] 628 
It has been argued that predictive processing models offer a plausible implementation for the 629 
neural-computational realization of affordance-responsiveness in the nervous system (Clark, 630 
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2016). As we shall see below, the free-energy model provides a mechanistic implementation of 631 
the dynamical gradient generation and consumption conception of affordance engagement 632 
examined above (Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014). Free-energy is minimized through action and 633 
perception by the predictive processing hierarchy, which provides a mechanistic implementation 634 
of the descriptive-prescriptive aspect of affordances.  635 
3. Cultural affordances and shared expectations  636 
We lack comprehensive accounts of how the conventions that give rise to sociocultural 637 
affordances are successfully internalized, both as implicit knowing how and explicit knowing 638 
that. As Searle and others (Tomasello, 2014; Tuomela, 2007 Sterelny, 2007; but see Zahavi & 639 
Satne, 2015) have shown, and as our models suggests, it takes higher-order levels of 640 
intentionality, meta-communication, and perspective-taking in order for symbolic conventions to 641 
be used and manipulated—and for more complicated, self-referential thinking (“I know that she 642 
thinks that I believe that she intends to X,” etc.), collective intentionality, and multiple orders of 643 
mindreading. 644 
The question for the present essay is how this framework can be scaled up to account for cultural 645 
and social cognition and learning. The everyday phenomenology of affordances is one of 646 
possibilities for action and their variations; in other words, of expecting certain nested action 647 
possibilities and prescriptions for action. In effect, the phenomenology of affordances is a 648 
phenomenology of expectations about available and appropriate agent-environment couplings. 649 
The neural-computational models derived from the free-energy principle traffics in predictions 650 
and conditional probability distributions (called ‘beliefs’ in Bayesian probability theory, without 651 
any claim to correspond to the folk psychological notion). Arguably, the phenomenological 652 
correlate of these Bayesian beliefs can, at least at some (presumably higher) levels of the 653 
predictive hierarchy, be thought of as (or at least codetermine) agent-level expectations. Our 654 
remarks below focus on clarifying how the social scaffolding of agents leads to their acquisition 655 
of representational content in regimes of shared attention.  656 
3.1. Skilled intentionality and affordance competition  657 
On the radical embodied view, the central feature of the dynamic relations between organisms 658 
and environment is the tendency of the organism to move towards an ‘optimal grip’ on the 659 
situation. The optima in question, as nearly everywhere in biology, are local optima, rather than a 660 
single global optimum. Under the free-energy framework, the ‘optimal grip’ can be understood 661 
as the pattern of action-perception that most minimizes variational free-energy. The free-energy 662 
minimizing dynamics of the predictive hierarchy might be described as a kind of weighted or 663 
biased competition between different affordances, the ‘affordance competition’ hypothesis 664 
(Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Pezzulo & Cisek, 2016). This model of action selection 665 
theorizes that the cognitive system appraises different trajectories for motor action 666 
simultaneously during action selection (that is, appraising a whole field of affordances in parallel 667 
and dynamically settling on the most salient affordance). 668 
Sport science provides an illustration of this tendency toward optimal grip (Hristovski et al., 669 
2006, 2009; Chow et al., 2011). Studies of the dynamic interplay between a boxer’s stance and 670 
position, and the action possibilities available to them as a function of stance and position, have 671 
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shown that punching bags afford different kinds of strikes to boxers as a function of the distance 672 
between boxer and punching bag. Boxers tend to move their bodies to an optimal distance from 673 
the punching bag, specifically, one that affords the greatest variety of strikes. This is a case of 674 
moving towards optimal grip. When observing a painting, we also move our bodies and our 675 
gazes in a way that maximizes our grip on the scene or details observed. We might call such 676 
dynamic adaptive engagement with field of affordances in rolling cycles of action-perception 677 
‘skilled intentionality’ (following Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld, 2008b, 2012; Merleau-678 
Ponty, 2012).  679 
Using the theoretical frameworks of dynamical systems and self-organization, Bruineberg and 680 
Rietveld (2014) have conceptualized this skilled intentionality as a kind of coping with the 681 
potentials that well up in the field of affordances, as a result of the dynamic relations between 682 
organism (with its phenotypical states, its states of action readiness, its concerns, etc.) and 683 
environment. More specifically, they suggest that skilled intentionality is the generation and 684 
reduction (or ‘consumption’) by the organism of a ‘gradient’ or potential tension in the field of 685 
affordances (which can be modeled using attractor dynamics). We sketched this approach in 686 
sections 1.2. and 1.3., without the free-energy framework. The full significance of dissipative 687 
dynamics in the field of affordances can now be appreciated.  688 
Affordances that are relevant to the organism at a given time (solicitations) drive system 689 
dynamics by soliciting rolling loops of action-perception and are prescribed and consumed or 690 
dissipated by those very dynamics (Tschacher & Haken, 2007). That is, solicitations are 691 
equivalent to potentials in the field of affordances, which act as attractors on the organism-692 
environment dynamics, changing those affordances to which the organism is selectively open 693 
and receptive. The solicitations with which the organism engages, on this view, is the one that 694 
most effectively minimizes free-energy. Affect, attention, and affordances interact to sculpt a 695 
field of solicitations out of the total landscape of available affordances, adaptively and 696 
dynamically moving the organism towards an optimal grip on situations through action-697 
perception. As the organism moves along a gradient toward an optimal grip, the gradient 698 
dissipates. The field of affordances thus changes dynamically along with perception-action and 699 
changes to states of the organism and environment. Responsiveness to the field, informed by 700 
states of the organism and environment, prescribe modes of optimal coupling. The radical 701 
embodied conception of cognition as skilled intentionality, then, can be modeled using systems 702 
theoretical models as a kind of selective responsiveness to salient available affordances or 703 
solicitations, modulated by states of the organism (concerns, interests, abilities) and states of the 704 
environment. This framework effectively bridges the descriptive levels of phenomenology, 705 
system dynamics, and cognitive functions or mechanisms.  706 
To date, most work on affordances has focused on motor control and basic behaviors related to 707 
dynamical embodied coping (e.g., Chemero, 2009; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Pezzulo & Cisek, 708 
2016). For a theory of cultural affordances, the notion of affordances must be extended to more 709 
complex features of the social and cultural niche inhabited by humans (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 710 
2014; Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014; Heft, 2001). Quintessential human abilities like language, 711 
shared intentionality, and mind-reading/perspective-taking emerge from human forms of life and 712 
are patterned by human sociocultural practices (Roepstorff, Niewohner & Beck, 2010), which in 713 
turn involve sophisticated forms of social cognition. We live in a landscape of cultural 714 
affordances.  715 
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3.2. Shared expectations, local ontologies, and cultural affordances   716 
The upshot of our discussion so far is a general concept of skilled intentionality as selective 717 
engagement with a field of affordances supported by embodied generative models. Skilled 718 
intentionality is a graded phenomenon. At one extreme, skilled intentionality consists in 719 
contentless direct coping. It has been suggested that this most basic form of intentionality, which 720 
Hutto and Satne (2015) call ‘ur-intentionality’, acquires its tendencies for selective targeted 721 
engagement with the world in a ‘teleosemiotic’ process shaped by evolutionary history.6 At this 722 
extreme, the only information (and affordances) needed are of the natural kind (exploitable 723 
reliable correlation). At the other extreme, we find stereotypical human intentionality, that is, 724 
symbolically dense and strongly content-involving forms of collectively and conventionally 725 
rooted intentionality (Kiverstein & Rietveld, 2015), which involves conventional information 726 
and affordances. This is a spectrum, and all points between these extremes are viable (at least 727 
prima facie). The teleological basis of this variation might be the needs, concerns, and abilities 728 
relevant to a given form of life, (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014), in 729 
specific social niches with their own idiosyncratic shared representations, symbols, etc.  730 
Our claim here is that cultural affordances (especially conventional ones) form a coordinated 731 
affordance landscape, which is enabled by sets of embodied expectations that are shared by a 732 
given community or culture. Social niches and cultural practices generally involve not isolated, 733 
individual affordances or expectations but local landscapes that give rise to and depend on shared 734 
expectations. We submit that these shared expectations—implemented in the predictive 735 
hierarchies, embodied in material culture, and enacted in patterned practices—contribute to the 736 
constitution of the landscape of affordances that characterizes a given community or culture. 737 
Indeed, shared expectations modulate the specific kinds of intentionality that are effective in a 738 
given community, determining the forms taken by skilled intentionality, especially the shared 739 
skilled intentionality of the kind that constitutes a patterned sociocultural practice.  740 
Patterned practices are specific ways of doing joint activities in domain-specific material-741 
discursive environments (Roepstorff, Niewohner, & Beck, 2010). Echoing recent work on the 742 
natural origin of semantic content (Hutto & Satne, 2015; Sterelny, 2015), we hypothesize that 743 
such ontologies, as socially shared and embodied expectations, come to be acquired by the 744 
individual agent through their participative immersion in specific patterned practices available in 745 
multi-agent, symbolically and linguistically mediated forms of social life.  746 
Building on work in cognitive science as well as by Hacking (1995, 1999, 2002, 2004), 747 
Kirmayer and colleagues have argued for an embodied, enactivist approach to the study of the 748 
multilevel feedback or ‘looping’ effects involved in jointly-mediated narratives, metaphors, 749 
forms of embodiment, and mechanisms of attention (Kirmayer, 2008, 2015; Kirmayer & Bhugra, 750 
2009; Seligman & Kirmayer, 2008). In human life, the regularities to which agents are sensitive 751 
                                                 
6 ‘Teleosemiotics’ is teleosemantics minus the semantics, that is, using the teleosemantic 
framework developed by Millikan (1984, 2004, 2005) to explain how organisms develop 
selective intentional response tendencies without trying to provide thereby an account of 
semantic content (Hutto & Myin, 2013). See also Kiverstein & Rietveld (2015) for a 
complementary account of minimal intentionality as a contentless form of skilled intentionality. 
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are densely mediated (and often constituted) by cultural symbols, narratives, and metaphors, 752 
which may explicitly reference or tacitly assume particular ontologies. These mechanisms shape 753 
social experience and in turn are shaped by broader social contexts. 754 
Elsewhere, we have suggested that local, culturally specific ontologies can be understood as sets 755 
of shared expectations (Kirmayer & Ramstead, 2016). A ‘local ontology’ can be defined as a 756 
mode of collective expectation: agents expect the sociocultural world to be disclosed in certain 757 
ways rather than others, and to afford certain forms of action-perception and nested variations to 758 
the exclusion of others. A local ontology, then, is a set of expectations that are shared by 759 
members of a cultural community. We claim that these sets of shared expectations are installed 760 
in agents through patterned practices that result in enculturation and enskillment. In the 761 
framework explored above, these ontologies codetermine the exact affordances that are available 762 
in a given niche, for they prescribe specific ways of being, thinking, perceiving, and acting in 763 
context that are situationally appropriate.  764 
These local ontologies need not be explicitly formulated as metaphysical theories. They are more 765 
often implicit and acquired through participation in patterned practices and the enactment of 766 
customs and rituals, or embodied in the social material reality itself (as symbols, places, stories). 767 
Such distinctively human practices take place in social niches rich with narratives, symbols, and 768 
customs, which enable individuals to respond cooperatively and, at times, to infer other agents’ 769 
states of mind. Such practices may underlie everyday processes of person-perception. For 770 
example, as noted in the introduction, by age 5, children have acquired local ontologies and 771 
categories of personhood—which reproduce the dominant set of biases, expectations, and 772 
representations of their cultures—showing preference for dominant group culture often without 773 
being explicitly taught to do so, and despite their caregivers not consciously holding such views, 774 
even when these biases are not consonant with their minority identities (Clark & Clark, 1939; 775 
Kinzler & Spelke, 2011). These tacit views of others may arise both from the ways in which 776 
local niches are structured by social norms and conventions and from regimes of attention and 777 
interpersonal interactions shaped by cultural practices (Richeson & Sommers, 2016). Biases in 778 
person-perception will, in turn, influence subsequent social interaction and cooperative niche 779 
construction in a cognitive-social loop (Sacheli et al., 2015). 780 
As discussed above, a number of theorists of embodied cognition have criticized the view that 781 
intersubjective interactions require that human beings be endowed with the capacity for mind-782 
reading, opting instead for an explanation in terms of embodied practices and coupling (Fuchs & 783 
De Jaegher, 2009; Gallagher, 2001, 2008). Although we readily grant the importance of such 784 
embodied coping for basic minds on which more elaborate cognition can be scaffolded, we 785 
advocate a middle ground that posits both embodied contentless abilities and more contentful 786 
mindreading abilities (Michael, Chiristensen, & Overgaard, 2014; Tomasello, 2014; Sterelny, 787 
2015;Veissière, forthcoming). Indeed, the framework we have proposed, which posits predictive 788 
processing hierarchies apt to engage with both natural and conventional information and 789 
affordances, can accommodate both modes of cognition. The view that human societies rely on 790 
explicit and implicit forms of mindreading does not commit us to intellectualism or to a strong 791 
content-involving view. The shared enactment of meaning, involving expectations about other 792 
agents, comes to constitute the shared, taken-for-granted meaning of local worlds, which in turn 793 
feeds back, in a kind of looping effect, to developmentally ground and scaffold the enactments of 794 
meaning by individual agents, by altering the shared expectations that are embodied and enacted 795 
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in the social niche (Kirmayer, 2015). These shared ontologies shape experience by changing the 796 
abilities and styles of action-perception of encultured agents.  797 
3.3. Shared expectations and implicit learning 798 
We have already appealed to Grice’s theory of meaning to clarify some aspects of affordances. 799 
Affordances come in a spectrum, ranging from those that depend only on reliable correlation to 800 
those that depend on shared sets of expectations. Grice’s account, as improved by others 801 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1998; Levinson, 2000; Tomasello, 2014), can help account for how we 802 
successfully learn to detect and selectively respond to context in situations that involve higher 803 
order contextual appraisal, including perspective-taking and reading of other’s goal-directed 804 
intent and actions. In higher-order, rule-governed semiotic contexts, the actual presence of others 805 
is not necessary for inferences to be made about the ‘correctness’ of affordances in terms of their 806 
correspondence to others’ expectations, norms or conventions. The general internalized idea of 807 
how others would interpret a situation and context (or how a culturally competent actor would 808 
respond) suffices for ‘meaning’ to be derived or inferred. 809 
Most of us have never been explicitly taught precisely how to behave, sit, move, speak, take 810 
turns, and interact with others in shared spaces such as metros, elevators, hallways, airplanes, 811 
university classrooms, bars, dance floors, janitors’ closets, or the many other spaces we know not 812 
to enter. As mentioned in the introduction to this essay, children acquire the dominant social 813 
norms and appropriate behavioral repertories and responses without explicit instruction. 814 
Although we do occasionally receive explicit instructions, these do not seem necessary for 815 
normal social functioning; as Varela (1999) pointed out, we have acquired the implicit ‘know 816 
how’ to act appropriately. That is, human beings acquire characteristic, stereotypical ways of 817 
doing and being in response to social contexts; in a sense, each of these constitutes habitual 818 
‘micro-selves’ as we variously engage the world as our ‘getting-on-the-bus-self’ to our ‘having-819 
lunch-self,’ etc., where each self is a style of situationally adequate and socially appropriate 820 
coupling to a context. How do we acquire the ability to selectively detect and respond to such 821 
sociocultural affordances? Or to rephrase the question in anthropological terms: How do we 822 
come to be socialized or enculturated for participation in shared worlds of expectations? 823 
The highly stable conformity of behavior in all of these contexts goes beyond direct imitation 824 
(Michael, Chiristensen, & Overgaard, 2014). Many everyday situations involve coordinated 825 
action among many participants. Although some forms of coordinated group action can occur 826 
entirely through individual responses to local impersonal affordances (e.g. the swarming of 827 
birds), in order to read and master the social cues and scripts in complex human settings, the 828 
actors involved need to grasp the situation from the perspective of other actors. This perspective-829 
taking is essential if each actor’s appraisal of the situation is to have any counterfactual depth 830 
with regard to explicit social norms (e.g., inferring that one’s behaving differently would fail to 831 
conform to others’ expectations about correct behavior). However, as argued above, in some 832 
instances this perspective-taking might not involve explicit, content-involving processes; the 833 
expectations might simply be encoded and leveraged for the generation of adaptive behavior 834 
without mentalistic assumptions being made about agents at an explicit, conscious level. Thus, in 835 
any case, for a given space to afford the same engagements to a given population, that 836 
community must come to share a set of collective expectations—indeed, shared expectations 837 
about others’ expectations about our expectations, and so forth.  838 
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4. Regimes of shared attention and shared intentionality  839 
The framework we have outlined for cultural affordances allows us to reconsider the natural 840 
origins of content. We hypothesize that the central mechanism whereby cultural affordances are 841 
acquired, especially conventional, content-involving affordances, consists in the looping or 842 
feedback relations between shared intentionality and shared attention. Shared intentionality is 843 
enacted in various concrete, materially embedded cultural practices and embodied as shared sets 844 
of expectation. Shared attention is one such form of shared intentionality. We suggest that shared 845 
attention is crucial because directed attention modulates the agent’s selective engagement with 846 
the field of affordances. Given the nature of the predictive hierarchy, to wit, to extract explicit 847 
and implicit statistical information, directing an agent’s attention is tantamount to determining 848 
which expectations (Bayesian prior beliefs) will be encoded in the hierarchy. This, in turn, leads 849 
to different sets of abilities being implemented by the gating mechanisms of the predictive 850 
hierarchy. Under the free-energy principle, action-perception is guided attention (precision-851 
weighting), and the gating process that is realized by attention itself rests on the expectations 852 
encoded in the generative models embodied by the organism. These high-level expectations 853 
about precision, which modulate allocations of attention (and thereby determine action-854 
perception through gating) are leveraged to guide skillful intentional behavior. The sets of 855 
expectations embodied and enacted by organisms change the field of affordances. This 856 
mechanism, we submit, is exploited by culture in the acquisition of cultural affordances.  857 
4.1. Gating, abilities, and affordances 858 
In the framework outlined above, we followed Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) in defining an 859 
affordance as a relation between a set of features or aspects of the organism’s material 860 
environment and the abilities available in that organism’s form of life. We are now in a position 861 
to better define an ability in terms of a gating control pattern, that is, a sequenced or coordinated 862 
process. An ability is simply the capability of an organism to coordinate its action-perception 863 
loops to skillfully engage an affordance in a way that is optimal under the free-energy principle. 864 
An ability, then, in the free-energy framework, includes a pattern of attention, in the specific 865 
sense employed by the free-energy framework. We use the term ‘attention’ not in the folk-866 
psychological sense, as that effort or mechanism that allows us to attend to specific aspects of 867 
experience, but as the mechanism of precision-weighting that mediates neural gating and allows 868 
the agent to engage with specific affordances in action-perception cycles. Attention, in our 869 
technical sense, therefore modulates effective connectivity and, as such, determines the 870 
trajectories taken by the rolling cycles of action-perception. Typically, in the case of human 871 
agents, such patterns of attention are acquired over development.  872 
We conjecture that we acquire our distinctively human abilities from our dense histories of 873 
temporally coordinated social interaction and shared cultural practices (Roepstorff, 2013; 874 
Tomasello et al., 2005). Attentional processes are central to this enculturation and installation of 875 
shared semantic content. In particular, the landscape of affordances available to the infant is 876 
sculpted, through joint-attentional practices that reflect sociocultural norms, into a field of 877 
relevant solicitations. Thus, participation in patterned practices allows the installation of socially, 878 
culturally, and situationally specific expectations, which, once acquired, determine agent 879 
allocations of attention (the acquisition of abilities) and, as a result, guide action-perception.  880 
  
24 
Joint (and, eventually, shared) attentional processes (Tomasello, 2014) provide a central 881 
mechanism through which the individual is molded to conform to specific group expectations 882 
and participate in forms of cooperative action. Joint and shared attention alter the field of 883 
affordances by directing the agent to engage with specific affordances, marking them out as 884 
relevant, and making them more salient. Given the nature of the predictive hierarchy, that is, to 885 
automatically extract statistical information about the distal world in its dynamic engagement (in 886 
action-perception), the agent will encode the regularities of the solicitations that it engages (that 887 
is, the relevant affordances to which it is directed in joint and shared attention). Of course, local 888 
practices of joint and shared attention themselves depend on agents sharing sets of 889 
expectations—the same expectations that become encoded by agents as they participate in these 890 
practices. Through participation in patterned cultural practices that direct attention in specific 891 
ways, the agent acquires sets of expectations that gave rise, in the first instance, to (earlier 892 
versions of) that very form of cooperative action (see Figure 6). Cultural affordances are thus 893 
mediated by recursive regimes of shared attention, of which joint-attention is a special, signal 894 
case (Tomasello, 2014). 895 
The study of everyday social interactions reveals how regimes of joint attention shape our 896 
understanding and sensory experiences of being in our worlds. For example, Goffman, who 897 
pioneered studies of face-to-face interaction in modern societies, showed how the ‘anonymized’, 898 
‘surface character’ of life in cities is routinized through what he called ‘civic inattention’—that 899 
is, through the many ways in which strangers avert their gazes, avoid conversations or physical 900 
contact, and reinforce private boundaries in the public sphere (Goffman, 1971, 385). We can 901 
follow Goffman’s lead to consider how different regimes of shared and joint-attention mediate 902 
lived experiences of meaning and being. Civic inattention, for example, is a specific regime of 903 
attention, but it is certainly not an absence of attention. In Goffman’s ‘Invisible City’ model, 904 
attentional resources are mobilized to not pay attention to certain features of the world, 905 
particularly other agents caught in a symbolically-marked game of allegiances that renders them 906 
strange or invisible.  907 
4.2. Looping the loop: Regimes of shared attention and skilled intentionality  908 
As we have seen above, in the predictive processing scheme, attention, understood as precision-909 
weighting of prediction error signals, is a central mechanism behind the dynamical trajectory of 910 
action-perception. The expectations about precision that guide action-perception are acquired in 911 
ontogeny and stored as high-level priors, which have the effect of arbitrating the balancing act 912 
between top-down prediction and bottom-up error signals. It follows that one pathway by which 913 
cultural affordances may be transmitted is through the manipulation of attention. This may occur 914 
in a variety of ways including what we might call ‘regimes of shared attention’. In the model of 915 
affordances outlined above, this kind of attentional modulation involves carving a local field of 916 
affordances out of the larger landscape of available affordances through social practices. Local 917 
environments and their associated practices are designed to solicit particular patterns of 918 
coordinated attention from participants (Clark, 2016; Kirchhoff, 2015a). In effect, these patterns 919 
act as dynamical attractors on the field of affordances, directing action-perception in some ways 920 
rather than others (Juarrero, 1999).  921 
In this light, one can view social norms and conventions as devices to reduce mutual uncertainty, 922 
that is, consonantly with the free-energy framework, as entropy-minimizing devices (Colombo, 923 
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2014). One must know ‘what is in the minds’ of others (such as what one would see and how one 924 
would interpret another’s action generally and in context) in order to make a successful inference 925 
(both explicit, content-involving or implicit, correlational inferences) about other agents in each 926 
situation. Goffman (1971) was hinting a similar processes with his comments on the ‘faces’ we 927 
learn to perform when we interact with others in different situations. We can be a mentor in one 928 
situation, and a mentee in another; a father in one and a friend in another. In Goffman’s famous 929 
comments on interaction in public, he describes (using other terms), how certain spaces afford 930 
more ‘backstage’, ‘off-screen’ performances than others. The privacy of the home affords such 931 
relaxed ‘off-stageness’, and the bedroom and bathroom even more so. All these instances require 932 
inferential mindreading or perspective-taking, that is, inferences about the presence or absence of 933 
other agents and their expectations as a normative guide for how one can behave. None of this 934 
depends specifically of whether these inferences consist in explicit mindreading or more implicit 935 
forms of embodied coupled enactments—both are compatible with our framework.    936 
Now, we might suppose that the distinctly human abilities with which we are endowed result 937 
simply from better evolved predictive machinery, that is, more computationally powerful 938 
predictive hierarchies (Conway & Christiansen, 2001). However, as we argued above, in human 939 
ontogeny, it is more likely that affordances are learned through regimes of imitation, repetition, 940 
positive and negative conditioning, and culturally selective forms of attention (Banaji, & 941 
Gelman. 2013; Meltzoff & Prinz, 2002: Whitehouse, 2002, 2004; Veissière, 2016; Roepstorff & 942 
Frith, 2004). The capacity for cultural learning may itself be a cultural innovation (Heyes, 2012). 943 
Indeed, the feedback or looping mechanisms between cultural practices of scaffolding individual 944 
attention (what we called regimes of attention) are themselves determined by the local ontologies 945 
(shared sets of expectations) and abilities (acquired patterns of attention and gating) of agents in 946 
that community. Repetition and reiteration of patterns of social and technological interaction, as 947 
well as rewards for ‘correct’ inferences that denote an adequate grasp of relevance, prescription, 948 
and proscription (e.g., when a child ‘gets’ that some X means some Y, or figures out an 949 
‘appropriate’ combination of meaningful elements in any given context), come to shape 950 
attentional mechanisms in ontogeny, and assist the child in successfully inferring a set of rules 951 
and categories (the culturally sanctioned sets of shared expectations).  952 
Joint attention is usually understood as occurring in a dyad of two people, or between agents in 953 
direct interactional spheres of communication, gaze-following, finger-pointing, or other verbal or 954 
non-verbal cues (Vygotsky, 1978; Tomasello, 2014). To address more complex social situations, 955 
it is useful to revise current sociocognitive models of joint-attention to encompass fundamentally 956 
triadic situations in which ‘the third’ is the socially constituted niche of affordances, supported 957 
by local ontologies and abilities. 958 
Shared human intentionality is sufficient to project joint attention to larger groups in the process 959 
of forming joint goals and inferring from joint expectations. Crucially, it commonly takes place 960 
without any direct interaction from members, in the many routinized, anonymous, symbolically 961 
and linguistically mediated forms of sociality, including engagement with social institutions.  962 
To go beyond the ‘toy models’ of dyadic joint attention to grasp the process of culture 963 
transmission we need to study the dynamics of ‘designer environments’ (Goldstone, Landy & 964 
Brunel, 2011; Salge, Glackin, & Polani, 2014). Human beings pattern their environments in a 965 
process of recursive niche construction, which in turn modulates the attributions of attention in 966 
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individual agents, leading them to acquire certain sets of priors rather than others, in what 967 
Sterelny (2003) has called ‘incremental downstream epistemic engineering’. This incremental 968 
process of constructing our own collective, epistemic niches, involves a kind of bootstrapping in 969 
which symbolically and linguistically mediated forms of human communication can be modeled 970 
as forms of re-entrant processing. Linguistically abled human beings produce patterned, 971 
structured outputs that become part of the material environment, and are subsequently picked up 972 
and further processed by other agents in ways that stabilize and elaborate a local social world 973 
(Clark 2006, 2008). Indeed, human-constructed environments, which shape agent expectations 974 
and guide patterns of attention, can be viewed as another level of the generative statistical model 975 
of the niche, which human beings leverage to guide intelligent behavior in their sociocultural 976 
symbolically- and linguistically-laden niches (Clark, 2016; Kirchhoff, 2015a). The prior 977 
knowledge that is leveraged in action-perception is thus encoded in multiple level and sites: in 978 
the hierarchical neural networks, in the organism’s phenotype (over phylogeny and ontogeny), 979 
and in patterned sociocultural practices and designer environments. 980 
Thus, our suggestion is that regimes of attention, which mediate the acquisition of cultural 981 
affordances (both natural and conventional), are enacted through patterned practices (especially 982 
those which modulate the allocation of attention) and are embodied in sundry ways: in the 983 
predictive hierarchies of individual agents in a community, as encoded sets of expectations, and 984 
in the concrete social and cultural world, as constructed human environments, designed to solicit 985 
certain expectations and direct attention.   986 
Conclusion  987 
We have outlined a framework for the study of cultural affordances in terms of neural models of 988 
predictive processing and social practices of niche construction. This approach can help account 989 
for the multilevel forms of affordance learning and transmission of affordances in socially and 990 
culturally shared regimes of joint-attention and clarify one of the central mechanisms that can 991 
explain the natural origins of semantic content. The concepts of affordance and skilled 992 
intentionality in ecological, radical embodied, and enactivist cognitive science can be 993 
supplemented with an account of the nature of affordances in the humanly constructed 994 
sociocultural niches. Turning to cultural niche construction, we argued in favor of a conception 995 
of local ontologies as sets of shared expectations acquired through the immersive engagement of 996 
the agent in feedback looping relations between shared intentionality (in the form of shared 997 
embodied expectations) and shared attention (modulated by regimes of attention). We elaborated 998 
Grice’s account of meaning by highlighting the dependence of selective responsiveness to 999 
cultural affordances on shared and joint intentionality, modes of conventionality and social 1000 
normativity. We ended with an account of the patterned regimes of attention and modes of social 1001 
learning that might lead to the acquisition and installation of such ontologies and affordances, 1002 
leading to agent enculturation and enskillment. We hope that our proposal of a framework for the 1003 
study of cultural affordances will spur further research on multilevel, recursive, nested 1004 
affordances and the expectations on which they depend.   1005 
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Figures and captions  1408 
Figure 1 1409 
Basic cognitive formula: three orders of automatic intentionality. 1410 
  1411 
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Figure 2 1442 
 1443 
Full cognitive formula: three orders of intentionality governing improvisational variations in 1444 
action. 1445 
  1446 
  
43 
Figure 3 1447 
 1448 
In the predictive processing approach, the main activity of the nervous system is to predict 1449 
upcoming sensory states and minimize the discrepancy between prediction and sensory states 1450 
(‘prediction errors’). The information propagated upward to higher levels for further processing 1451 
consists only in these prediction errors. 1452 
  1453 
  
44 
Figure 4 1454 
 1455 
A diagram of Bayesian inference in predictive processing architectures. The dynamics of such 1456 
systems conform to the principles of the Bayesian statistical inference framework. The Bayesian 1457 
statistical framework is central to predictive processing architectures, for the latter assume that 1458 
neural network interactions operate in a way that maximizes Bayesian model evidence. Bayesian 1459 
methods allow one to calculate the probability of an event taking place by combining the ‘prior 1460 
probability’ of this event (the probability that such an event takes place before considering any 1461 
evidence) with the ‘likelihood’ of that event, that is, the probability of that event given some 1462 
evidence. This allows the Bayesian system to calculate the ‘posterior probability’ of the event, 1463 
that is, the revised probability given any new available evidence. Prior probabilities are carried 1464 
by predictions (green arrows) issued by the generative model units (green units). Likelihoods are 1465 
carried by prediction errors (red arrows) issued by the error units (red units). In the ‘empirical 1466 
Bayes’ framework, the system can then use the posterior obtained from one iteration as the prior 1467 
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in the next iteration. Predictions issued from the generative models, which encode prior beliefs, 1468 
propagate up, down, and across the hierarchy (through backwards and lateral connections) and 1469 
are leveraged to guide intelligent adaptive action-perception. This leveraging is achieved by 1470 
cancelling out (or ‘explaining away’) discrepancies, which encode likelihood, through rolling 1471 
cycles of action-perception. This same process allows the system to learn through plastic 1472 
synaptic connections, which are continuously updated through free-energy minimization in 1473 
action-perception. The system thus continuously and autonomously updates its ‘expectations’ 1474 
(Bayesian prior beliefs) in rolling cycles of action-perception. 1475 
  1476 
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Figure 5 1477 
 1478 
Diagram of hierarchical structure of the predictive processing networks. Predictive networks 1479 
have hierarchical structure in the sense that their processing is layered. The layered (hierarchical) 1480 
structure of the generative model allows the model to capture the nested structure of statistical 1481 
regularities in the world. This inferential architecture effectively allows the system to leverage 1482 
new information dynamically and implement a ‘bootstrapping’ process, whereby the system 1483 
extracts its own priors from its dynamic interactions with the environment. Computationally, 1484 
each individual layer has the function of extracting and processing information leveraged to cope 1485 
with regularities at a given level or scale. In this example, information about the visual scene is 1486 
decomposed into high, medium, and low spatial frequency bands. Typically, low spatial 1487 
frequency features change at a faster than high spatial frequency features. As such, lower spatial 1488 
frequency information is encoded higher up in the processing hierarchy, to guide lower-level, 1489 
faster processing of higher spatial frequency information. The hierarchical or layered statistical 1490 
structure of the generative model enables it to recapitulate the salient statistical structure of those 1491 
systems to which it is coupled. As discussed in the text, this need not imply semantic content 1492 
(but does not exclude it either). 1493 
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Figure 6 1495 
 1496 
A diagram of the looping effects that mediate cultural affordance learning. Regimes of attention, 1497 
a central kind of patterned cultural practice, and higher level expectations encoded in higher 1498 
levels of the cortical hierarchy, guide agents’ attentional styles. In the free-energy framework, 1499 
attention is modelled as precision-weighting and has the function of controlling activation across 1500 
the various levels of the cortical hierarchy by tuning the gain on error units (that is, they realize 1501 
the function of gating effective connectivity in the brain). In turn, differences in how attention is 1502 
deployed (through gating) lead to varying salience landscapes and to different expectations being 1503 
encoded in the predictive hierarchy. Based in part on Figure 1 in Friston et al. (2014). 1504 
  1505 
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Box 1 1471 
Basic concepts of a framework for cultural affordances  1472 
Affordance: A relation between a feature or aspect of organisms’ material environment and an 1473 
ability available in their form of life. (Chemero, 2003, 2009; Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; 1474 
Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014)  1475 
Landscape of affordances: The total ensemble of available affordances for a population in a 1476 
given environment. This landscape corresponds to what evolutionary theorists in biology and 1477 
anthropology call a ‘niche’. (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014; 1478 
Rietveld, 2008a, 2008c; Rietveld, de Haan & Denys, 2013) 1479 
Field of affordances: Those affordances in the landscape with which the organism, as an 1480 
autonomous individual agent, dynamically copes and intelligently adapts. The field refers to 1481 
those affordances that actually engage the individual organism because they are salient at a given 1482 
time, as a function of the interests, concerns, and states of the organism. (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 1483 
2014; Bruineberg & Rietveld, 2014; Rietveld, 2008a, 2008c) 1484 
Cultural affordance: The kind of affordance that humans encounter in the niches that they 1485 
constitute. There are two kinds of cultural affordances: natural and conventional affordances.  1486 
Natural affordance: Possibilities for action (i.e. affordances), the engagement with which 1487 
depends on the exploitation or leveraging by an organism of ‘natural information’, that is, 1488 
reliable correlations in its environment, using its set of phenotypical and encultured abilities 1489 
(roughly what Grice meant by ‘natural meaning’). (Piccinini, 2015; Piccinini & Scarantino, 1490 
2010, 2011; Piccinini, 2015) 1491 
Conventional affordance: Possibilities for action, the engagement with which depends on 1492 
agents’ skillfully leveraging explicit or implicit expectations, norms, conventions, and 1493 
cooperative social practices in their ability to correctly infer (implicitly or explicitly) the 1494 
culturally specific sets of expectations of which they are immersed. These are expectations about 1495 
how to interpret other agents, and the symbolically and linguistically mediated social world. 1496 
(Tomasello, 2014; Satne, 2015; Scarantino, 2015; Scarantino & Piccinini, 2010)  1497 
